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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
Hll'HARD NOLAN JARDINE, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent,( 
vs. I 
BRUNS\VICK CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10631 
STATE1MENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Plaintiff alleges he was damaged when he financed 
the investor who was supposed to finance him in a bowl-
ing venture, plaintiff's expenditures allegedly resulting 
from misrepresentation by defendant as to the investor's 
ability. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The court denied Brunswick's motion to dismiss at 
the close of plaintiff's case and ultimately entered judg-
ment for plaintiff for $28,714.34 and costs. 
RELIEF, SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment and dis-
missal of the action. 
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STATEMEN'r OFF ACTS 
Since this court on appeal looks at the facts most 
favorably to the respondent, we state the facts as they 
appear from plaintiff's case in chief, ignoring the facts 
developed by appellant in its defense. Such basis for 
the statement of facts also clearly delineates appellant's 
contention that Brunswick's motion to dismiss at the 
close of plaintiff's case was well taken. 
Jardine was a retired "self made" man. Although 
he had had little formal schooling, he had been successful 
in accumulating assets worth about a quarter of a million 
dollars through various business ventures, including the 
operation of a sawmill in which he had about 30 em-
ployees, trucking, farming and building and leasing busi-
ness properties. (R. 120-124, 181-187) He became inter-
ested in becoming the operator of a bowling alley. Ida 
Young, a lady who was a friend of plaintiff's, a bowler, 
and a real estate saleslady suggested he talk with Bruns-
wick, who sells bowling equipment. (R. 125) Costs of 
equipment and building were discussed and it was de-
cided that Jardine did not want to attempt to undertake 
to finance the entire venture, but that Jardine would 
buy the bowling equipment if an investor were found who 
wanted to handle the financing of and construct the 
building and lease it to Jardine. (R. 127, 189) Brunswick 
said it thought financing was no problem, that there were 
investors available who were interested in constructing 
a building for lease to an operator. (R. 127) Brunswick 
introduced a doctor to ,Jardine as one interested in mak-
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ing 8urh an investment, and Jardine went to a bowling 
operntorn' 8chool given by Brunswick in Chicago. The 
dortor however declined the proposition. (R. 131) Bruns-
wick then introduced Jardine to Jack Charlesworth, as a 
person who could build and finance the building. (R. 133) 
Charlesworth was then working on a con8truction project, 
constructing between 15 and 20 houses at Hill Field. 
Charlesworth took Jardine, Jardine's son and Ida Young, 
all of whom were interested in obtaining a bowling alley 
to operate, and who later formed and owned Sunrise 
Lane8, Inc., as the operating company (R. 202-204, 321), 
on an inspection trip to take a look at his work at Hill 
Field and it appeared therefrom as if "he would have 
lJlenty of money, and plenty corning in." (R. 251) Charles-
worth told them he expected an income from that project 
in the range of $60,000 which he expected to put into 
the bowling alley building. (R. 215, 251) 
Charlesworth had also made arrangements with 
third parties to build other buildings for other bowling 
alley operators. (R. 252-255) 
Jardine and Charlesworth, after considering a build-
ing site recommended by Brunswick, on which it held an 
option (R. 128, 136), expanded their plans and decided 
to acquire a large 181;2 ac.re tract on which J ardine'8 
friend, Ida Young, would obtain a commission. (R. 137-
139, 245, 286) This was to be acquired as a site for a 
shopping center complex. (R. 137) Brunswick thought 
the part to be used for bowling lanes was suitable. (R. 
245) 
4 
Charlesworth thereupon formed a new corporation, 
Compact Building Company, with Charlesworth as presi-
dent. (Ex. P. 2, R. 3-19) It was intended that the new 
corporation would purchase the site and construct tlw 
building. (R. 13±, 135, L13) ·when, ho-wever, the initial 
$500 down payment on a total purchast' price of $37 ,000 
for the land could not be raised by Compact, the contem-
plated transaction was changed. ( R. 1±7, 215, Ex. P. G, 
R. 3±9) Jardine contracted to buy the 18% acres himself, 
taking a deed for 2 acres, valued at $±,000, on which the 
bowling building was to be built, paying $9,000 of the 
purchase price to the seller. (Ex. P. 6, R. 349, R. 147, 148, 
247) Jardine then conveyed the 2 acres to Compact who 
agreed to build, lease to Jardine and reimburse him for 
the payment. (Ex. P. 8, R. 349, Ex. P. 9, R. 3±9) 
When the Hill Field payments did not materialize as 
anticipated, 'Compact did not have funds for construction 
on the 2 acre site thus acquired and owned by it. (R. 218, 
219, 259, 297) Charlesworth knew that Jardine had $23,-
000 cash which he was going to use as a down payment 
on the equipment he was going to buy from Brunswick. 
(R. 297) Charlesworth asked Jardine to advance $23,000 
to Compact to be repaid in ample time for the purchase 
of the bowling equipment. (R. 297) Brunswick wrote the 
following letter to Jardine: 
"At the request of 1\fr. Jack Charlesworth, I 
am writing this note to inform you that it will be 
satisfactory with us for you to pay the majority 
of the balance due remaining of your down pay-
ment upon the arrival of the lanes. This amount 
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will be a sight draft attached to a Shipper's Order 
Bill of Lading." (.l!Jx. P. 10, R. 349) 
\VlH·n asked for a "stronger" statement, Brunswick re-
fus8ecl. ( H. 299) This letter was delivered by Charles-
worth to Jardine. (R. 299) \\Then asked by Jardine about 
the transaction as proposed, Brunswick said it was all 
right with Brunswick, but warned Jardine to "protect 
yourself." (R. 157, 200) The $23,000 was advanced by 
Jardine to Compact. According to J ardine's testimony, 
Jardine advanced the $23,000 relying upon the fact that 
Charlesworth told Jardine that Charlesworth was going 
to get payments from the Hill Field job in order to pay 
Jardine. Jardine further testified that the reason he 
advanced the $23,000 was because Brunswick wrote the 
above quoted letter, delaying the down payment. (R. 219) 
Jardine took a promisso·ry note, executed by Compact 
and Charlesworth, secured only by an assignment of the 
proceeds of a life insurance policy in the event of Charles-
worth's death. (R. 157, 200, 262) Construction was then 
commenced. 
When the moneys which were anticipated from the 
Hill Field construction project were not forthcoming, 
laborers and materialmen could not be paid. (R. 163) 
No loan could then be obtained on the unfinished bowling 
building project. (R. 266) Mechanics lien claimants 
brought an action to foreclose their liens. Jardine and 
Compact were parties to the foreclosure action in which 
there were various claims, counterclaims and cross 
claims. (Case No. 138888, R. 350) Compact deeded the 
2 acre site back to Jardine. (Ex. 14, R. 349) Jardine, 
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while represented by his comrnel in tlw foreclosure suit, 
entered into a compromise settlement which released 
Compact from any claim Jardine had arising out of thP 
transaction. (R. 226) 
Jardine paid $1,000 to Brurnnvick as a down payment 
on the contract to buy equipment. He expended $175.00 
for food and lodging while attending school in Chicago, 
$169.10 for train fare, agreed to pay his sons $350.00 to 
attend a bowling school in Los Angeles and paid Dodson 
Welding $20.24 for work on the building. The fair market 
value of the 2 acre tract was $4000. These items together 
with the $23,000 loan totalled $28,714.34, the amount of 
the judgment. (R. 167) The court found these expendi-
tures were made in reliance upon Brunswick's representa-
tions as to Charlesworth's ability to build and finance a 
biulding, which representations the court found to be 
false, which Brunswick would have known to be false had 
it made investigations. 
Jardine had formed a eo·rporation, Sunrise Lanes, 
Inc., as a prospective operator of the bowling lanes. (R. 
202) This corporation had as principal stockholders and 
officers, Jardine, his two adult sons, and his real estate 
broker Ida Young with all of whom he consulted before 
each of his ventures. (R. 203-206, 321) Although he used 
his lawyer for the incorporation, he did not consult him 
on any of the other transactions related herein, but, 
instead, used his real estate saleslady, Ida Young, to 
draft the documents involved including deeds, contracts, 
agreements, notes and lease. (R. 139, 193, 208) 
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'L1h<• only n:idc•nl'.<' in plaintiff'::-; ca::-;e of representa-
tions c-orn·erning Charl(•s\rn·rth or Compact is the follow-
ing: 
(a) .J ardine's tPsti1110ny ielating to the introduction 
of .Jardine to Charll·sworth hy Brunswick's Tracy, when 
no loan was conternplatt·cl. 
"A. Well, .Jark Charlesworth came in a little 
hit latc'. \Ve were all in there when he came. When 
he came in Harold Tracy got up and told me, 
"rl1is \\'as Jack Charlesworth, President of Com-
pact Building Company and that he could build 
these buildings and finance them and there was 
nothing to worry about.'" (R. 133) 
(b) J ardine's testimony relating to a comment made 
by Dinius of Brunswick when Charlesworth said, 
"he had his money tied up, wasn't able to 
gt>t this down payment for this ground at the 
particular time and wondered if I (Jardine) would 
advance the money for the ground. Carl Dinius 
said, if this would hurry the thing and get it in 
gear he thought it would be a good thing - - - - . If 
we can get this thing started now we will have it 
open for the leagues. If it drags on getting started 
we could be in trouble for the fall leagues." (R. 
147-148) 
( c) J ardine's testimony relating to a comment made 
by Dinius of Brunswick on Charlesworth's Hill Field job, 
" - - - - that he felt like this draw would be 
okay and he wouldn't have any problems, and 
Dinius himself and Harold and everybody con-
cerned \Vas anxious to get this thing going - - - - . 
vV e had discussed several times - - - - as to the 
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ability he had once he got the money from Hill 
Field - - - - . The general statement \Y~S that wlwn 
he got this mom•y that it could be n•ally roiling 
and it seemed like we were all happy at this point'' 
(R. 233-235) 
( d) Ida Young's testimony relating to a comment 
made by Dinius of Brunswick, 
"I remember distinctly Carl Dinius saying 
that l\fr. Charlesworth, after he completes the 
construction of this bowling alley, from then on 
Brunswick themselves are going to finance him 
on all the rest of the buildings for the Brunswick 
equipment. Now, this is the statenwnt that was 
made at the time. Not only that, another state-
ment that I remember Harold Tracy making was 
that Charlesworth would be a good man to build 
the building bPcause he knew exactly how to c-On-
struct that building to house the Brunswick lanes." 
(R. 252) 
( e) Ida Young's testimony relating to comments 
made by Dinius of Brunswick, 
" - - - - That he thought that l\fr. Charlesworth 
would be a good contractor for l\Ir. Jardine, that 
he knew exactly how to build the building to house 
the Brunswick lanes. He knew how to build the 
building to Brunswick's specifications for their 
lanes. l can't remember how it came up about 
Mr. Charlesworth's project up close to Hill Field. 
- - - - And I believe at that time that Mr. Charles-
worth said he would like to take all of us up to see 
the project up at Hill Field, and Mr. Dinius said 
he thought that would be a good idea - - - - that 
he had a nice setup." (R. 274) 
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Liahilitict:> of Charlc·t:>worth and Compact were shown 
hy Plaintiff't:> 1£xhibit 1 (It. 049) but there was no evi-
dent:\~ rPlating to assets or m't worth of either, nor wat:> 
thl· solvency of either one discussed. (R. 214) 
rrhere was no evidence that payments were not 
L·x1wcted from Hill Field by all concerned, nor does plain-
tiff's record show why UH· payments ultimately were not 
received. 
STATEl\lI£NT OF POINTS AND ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE 
CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE SHOULD HA VE 
BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE CON-
STITUTING PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN CHIEF DOES 
NOT SHOW A CAUSE OF ACTION GENERALLY 
AND IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS, IN 
THAT SAID EVIDENCE FAILED TO SHOW: 
(a) A REPRESENTATION. 
(b) ITS FALSITY. 
(c) ITS MATERIALITY. 
(d) DEFENDANT'S KNOWLEDGE OF ITS 
FALSITY OR IGNORANCE OF ITS TRUTH. 
(e) DEFENDANT'S INTENT THAT ANY REP-
RESENTATION BE ACTED UPON BY PLAINTIFF 
AND IN THE MANNER REASONABLY CONTEM-
PLATED. 
(f) PLAINTIFF'S IGNORANCE OF ITS F ALS-
ITY. 
(g) PLAINTIFF'S RELIANCE UPON ITS 
TRUTH. 
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(h) PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO RELY THEREON. 
(i) PLAINTIFF'S CONSEQUENT AND PROXI-
MATE INJURY. 
The nine clements listed ahovP are requisite for 
liability for misrepn'sentation. Stuck v. Delta Land & 
Wa.ter Company, 63 U. 495, 227 P. 791, 795, cited with 
approval in many Utah cases including Pace v. Parrish, 
122 U. 141, 247 P. 2d 273. 
(a) REPRESENTATION. 
Considering the introduction made by Brunswick of 
Charlesworth to Jardine in light of the circumstances, 
there was no "representation." 
When the introduction was made, it was for the 
purpose of getting together one ·who wanted to take the 
financial risk of constructing and owning a building with 
one who wanted to lease it on completion. 
There was no thought in anyone's mind then that Jar-
dine would advance risk capital. Therefore, when Bruns-
wick said, by way of introduction, that Charlesworth was 
a person "who could build the buildings and finance them" 
this was neither intended as, nor would it reasonably have 
been construed by Jardine as being, a representation as 
to Charlesworth's credit. It was, rather, an expression 
of opinion that the desired building could be acquired 
through Charlesworth. There was no representation of 
fact, rather a statement of opinion. In fact, Jardine 
testified that the solvency of Charlesworth or Compact 
was not discussed by Brunswick. (R. 214) 
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Then• \Yas an expression of 01nnwn by Brunswick 
hnt nu reprel:'.lcntation of fact. Charlesworth told Jardine 
that the building would be built by getting a mortgage and 
by using money he expected to receive. 
"Q. You, in fact, had talked with Charles-
worth right after you met Charlesworth about how 
Charlesworth - or Compact Building would get 
this building built, didn't you? 
A. Yes, with Dinius. The three of us were 
together. 
Q. And it was Charlesworth who told you 
how he would do it, wasn't it~ 
A. Well, I think that he mentioned at the 
time he would have to get a mortgage on this 
ground plus money he already had coming he 
could do the building.'' (R. 209) 
Whether said mortgage could be obtained in the future, 
and whether funds would be received in the future can be 
the basis of speculation and opinion, but not the basis 
for a representation of fact. 
(b) F ALSJiTY. 
Plaintiff did not show that the statement, made on 
introduction, that Charlesworth could "build the build-
ings and finance them," was then an untrue statement. 
The statement did not relate to solvency, at least 
in J ardine's mind, because Jardine stated that solvency 
of Charlesworth or of Compact was not discussed. (R. 
21-t) But if it be assumed that it did relate to solvency, 
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there \\·as no evidencp relating to assets or net worth of 
either Charlesworth or Compact. 
The statement could have n•lat<•d to skill in con-
structing buildings. Assuming it did, there was no evi-
dence that Charlesworth or Comvact was unskilled. 
The stateuwnt probably related in part to the fact 
that Charlesworth could obtain construction pen;onnel 
and equipment and in part that he would be able to pay 
for the construction as it progressed. Assuming it did, 
as to the first part, there is no evidence as to Charles-
worth's or Com1iact's personnel or equipment. As to the 
second part, the evidence was that when the statement 
was made, income was coming in from the Hill Field pro-
ject ·which was going to be used for the construction, 
but that subsequently conditions changed, income was not 
received as expected, and once in the bind of having a 
half completed building, interim financing could then not 
be obtained. There was no evidence that Charlesworth 
and everyone else concerned didn't anticipate that per-
iodic payments totaling about $60,000 would be forthcom-
ing from the Hill Field project which could be used for 
the construction of the bowling building. The only evi-
dence was to the contrary,that when the representation 
was made these payments were expected. The statement, 
therefore, was true when made. 
Plaintiff attempted to show that the builder was not 
licensed. At the time any statement regarding ability to, 
build was made, the corporation 'vith whom plaintiff later 
dealt was not yet in existence, and so could not have had 
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a licen:-;e. Although a license had been issued to anoilier 
business entity based on an examination taken and passed 
by Charles\vorth (R. 285) the question of license, or lack 
tlwreof, is not material because one constructing a build-
ing for himself is not a contractor, and needs no license. 
58-23-2(5), UCA 1953. Such was the case here. 
There was no evidence as to what investigation 
Brunswick made or what was found on any such investi--
gation. 
(c) MATERIALITY. 
The statement that Charlesworth could build the 
buildings and finance them relates to and is material 
to the contemplated transaction in which Charlesworth 
would build and lease to Jardine, but does not relate to 
and is therefore not material to the subsequent reversed 
transaction in which Jardine did the financing. Jardine 
is not complaining about not getting a lease, but of losses 
incurred on loans. 
( d) KNOWLJiJDGE. 
There is no evidence concerning Brunswick's know-
ledge of Companct's solvency, skill, ability, credit or 
income. Plaintiff, in presenting his case, had no Bruns-
wick employee nor any other witness testify as to know-
ledge of Brunswick. 
Compact expected money in the future which did 
not materialize. Holding Brunswick liable necessitates 
the conclusion that Brunswick should have realized iliat 
14 
for some reason, not shown in plaintiff's eas<>, tht- fund:-; 
would not eventually be forthcoming. There was no evi-
dence as to what Brunswick knew or should have known 
about the future income from Hill Field. 
(e) INTEN1-1 THAT Rli.:PRESENTATION BE 
ACTED UPON IN MANNER REASONABLY 
CONTEMPLATED. 
One introducing a landlord to a prospective tenant 
does not reasonably contemplate that the prospective 
tenant will lend the funds for acquisition and construc-
tion without security. 
Forseeability of damage is necessary. 
"In order that such liability may exist, it is 
necessary that ... the person giving the informa-
tion should have, or be chargeable with, knowledge 
that ... the person to whom it is given will be 
likely to be injured in person or in property as 
a result of acting thereon." 
65 CJS Negligence, Par. 20. 
See also, 37 CJS Fraud, Par. 141 
Plaintiff must have relied on a representation in a 
transaction intended by defendant. 
"One who in the course of his business or pro-
fession supplies information for the guidance of 
others in their business transactions is subject to 
liability for harm caused to them by their reliance 
upon the information if 
(a) he fails to exercise that care and compe-
tence in obtaining and communicating the 
information which its recipient is justi-
fied in expecting, and 
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( b) the harm is suffered 
(ii) because of his justifiable reliance 
upon it in a transaction in which it 
was intended to influence his con-
duct or in a transaction substan-
tially therewith." 
"h. TRANSACTIONS FOR GUIDANCE 
IN WHICH THE INFORMATION IS SUP-
PLIED. As in the case of a maker of a fradulent 
representation, the liability of one who negligently 
supplies information for the guidance of another 
is restricted to the loss suffered in the transaction 
for guidance in which the information was furn-
ished or in a transaction of the same type and of 
substantially the same extent. Thus, accountants 
who negligently make an audit of the books of the 
A Corporation, which they are told is to be used 
for the purpose of obtaining a particular line of 
banking credit, are not subject to liability to a 
wholesale merchant whom the corporation has 
induced to supply it with goods on credit by show-
ing him the certificate of the audit. On the other 
hand, it is not necessary that the transaction in 
which the negligent audit is relied upon should be 
the very one to influence which the audit has been 
made. It is enough that it is a transaction sub-
stantially identical therewith. Thus, in the situa-
tion above dealth with, if the corporation, finding 
that at the moment it does not need the credit 
to obtain which the audit was procured, subse-
quently uses it to obtain from the bank a later 
credit, the accountants will be liable to the bank 
for the loss resulting from its extension of the 
credit unless the financial condition of the cor-
poration has materially changed in the interim." 
American Law Institute, Restatement of 
Torts, Par. 552. 
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When introducing a prospective landlord to a pro. 
spective tenant, defendant would not reasonably have 
contemplated that the transaction would change and that 
instead of having a building built for him to occupy, the~ 
tenant would himself advance funds for the construction 
of the building he was to occupy. Even if such a compleh• 
s1.vitch should have reasonably been contemplated, it 
would be even more remote that plaintiff would have 
reasonably contemplated that such financing would be 
made without a credit check, an examination of financial 
statements and without adequate security. The record 
shows that after he decided to finance the construction, 
plaintiff did none of these. (R. 208) 
Not only did Brunswick not contemplate at the time 
it made the introduction of the prospective landlord and 
tenant that a statement then made would be relied upon 
in a transaction whereby the tenant financed the con-
struction, but when Brunswick heard that plaintiff was 
later contemplating such a transaction, Brunswick ex-
pressly warned plaintiff to "protect yourself." (R. 157, 
200) This shows that Brunswick had not previously 
contemplated that a loan would be made. 
Since no loan was contemplated at the time a state-
ment was made, loss arising therefrom is not actionable. 
(f) IGNORANCE. 
Plaintiff had many meetings with Charlesworth who 
told plaintiff about his Hill Field job which later caused 
financial problems on the bowling alley. Plaintiff even 
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11. ('ill tu 11 ill Fi<·ld with Charlet>worth and examined the 
\\ ork and obt>c'l'VPd its status. (R. 210, 250) 
Charlet>\\'orth told plaintiff he was in financial diffi-
rnlt)' lweansc~ hit> vaymcntt> on the Hill Field job were not 
fortl1eoming. (R. 21G) 
The very fact the builder didn't even have the down 
paym('nt, much k•ss money even to start construction, 
\rnuld gin~ any reasonable person knowledge of financial 
difficulty. 
( g) RELIANCE. 
Jardine consulted with Ida Young, the real tor who 
drafted the various documents and who interested him 
initially in the bowling alley project. (R. 199) He con-
wlted with his sons. (R. 206) He consulted with Charles-
worth and checked on Charlesworth's work. (R. 250) He 
ignored defendant's recommendation as to a building 
t>ite. (R. 128, 136) All indicate lack of reliance. 
But of more importance, Jardine's testimony regard-
ing "reliance" in making the $32,000 loan, was that he 
relied on two things, Charlcsworth's statement and 
Brnnswick's letter. Jardine testified: 
"Q. How did you know he had it coming? 
A. Just from what he told me. 
Q. ~What did he say~ 
A. He said he had this money coming from Hill 
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Field. 
Q. On this Hill Field project you had exarnim'd 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. 'Vhat did he say''? -When did he expect it? 
A. I believe he told me he got paid on the 15th 
of each month. 
Q. How much money did he ::my he had coming 1 
A. Golly, I don't remember for sure. But it 
seemed to me $58 or $60,000.00 at this - I 
can't say this for sure. 
Q. It was in that range wasn't it? 
A. Plenty sufficient to take care of -
Q. Yes. And so you relied upon Charlesworth's 
statement that he was going to get that money 
from Hill Field, didn't you -
A. Yes." (R. 215) 
"Q. Then the same situation prevailed on the 
$23,000.00 as prevailed on the $9,000.00 as to 
Charlesworth's statement to you as to why 
he needed an advance? 
A. This is true. 
Q. And you were still relying upon the fact that 
he told you he was going to get payments 
from the Hill Field job in order to pay you~ 
Is that right? 
A. This is true, but this isn't - this isn't the 
reason I gave him the money. The reason I 
gave him this money was because Bob Dobbs 
sent me this note telling me it was all right to 
give it to him. Without that note, I wouldn't 
have given him nothing." (R. 218-219) 
The letter is Exhibit P. 10 in which Dobbs of Bruns-
wick merely stated Brunswick would be willing to post-
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pon<> !'<'el•ipt of paymenh; from Jardine, and which was 
deliv<•red ~with the \Yarning, ''protect yourself." The letter 
in nn way indicates that Brunswick is recommending that 
tlte money due it should he advanced to Charlesworth. 
ft is simvly an agreement by Brunswick to postpone 
n•(•(•ipt of a dO\vn payment. There is no evidence of 
reliauee upon a representation by Bnmswick. 
(h) RIGHT TO RELY. 
Plaintiff was a middle aged businessman who had 
owned business properties and had operated various 
enterprises including contractor for hauling, contractor 
for cutting timber, owner and operator of sawmill em-
ploying 30 men, builder and owner of grocery store, 
barber shop and cafe. All were profitable. (R. 120-124, 
181) He had used lawyers in various business transac-
tions but didn't on this one, (R. 165) yet he seeks to be 
held harmless from results of his own poor business 
judgment. He seeks to impose upon Brunswiok the duty 
it would have if it were his guardian, merely because 
Brunswick "recommended" a builder. A general recom-
mendation is not actionable because it is a mere mattm· 
of opinion. 
"When the representation is made concern-
ing something which is mere matter of opinion, 
which every man can exercise his own judgment 
upon and inquire about, it is the plaintiff's own 
fault if he suffers himself to be deceived." 
Stuck et. ·al. v. Delta Land & Water Co., 
63 U. 495, 227 P. 791, 795, 796. 
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Brunswick's statement that Charlet:>worth wat:> a good 
builder can't support an action in fraud or negligence. 
A general statement re financial t:>tanding is not 
actionable. 
''A general statement or report stating con-
clusions as to the financial standing of a third 
person which is made the basis of credit to him 
is not generally actionable." 
23 Am. J ur. Fraud and Deceit, p. 845, note 20. 
See also, 32 ALR 2nd 209. 
Here, there was no representation of fact. 
Plaintiff may not rely upon statements where he has 
equal means of discovery. He could have checked on the 
builder himself and in fact did investigate the builder 
by checking his current project at Hill Field, which was 
the very project, the failure of which precipitated Jar-
dine's loss. (R. 210, 250) 
"The representations that the note was 'as 
good as gold,' and that the investment company 
would see that the plaintiff 'did not lose a penny,' 
in and of themselves ; are matters of mere opinion, 
exaggerated statements, and trade talk, and not 
actionable. So far as made to appear, the plaintiff 
and the investment company dealt at arm's length 
with equal means of knowledge, dealing with each 
other on equal terms and free from and unin-
fluenced by any fiduciary or trust relation .... 
"Not anything is shown or made to appear, 
~or is there any claim made, that the plai111tiff 
had not equal means with the investment company 
to find out the financial responsibility of the 
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\Vhik8, nor is it shown or made to appear or any 
claim made that tlwre was anything with respect 
to their financial responsibility or inability to pay 
the note which was peculiarly within the know-
ledge of the investment company and not of the 
plaintiff, or that any such matter was withheld 
from the plaintiff by the company. It was shown 
that about six months or more after the plaintiff 
purchased the note, -White went into bankruptcy. 
If when the plaintiff purchased the note -White 
was then insolvent, not anything is made to appear 
that the inve8tlnent company had knowledge of 
such fact. 'l1he plaintiff testified she has no lmow-
ledge of -White's delinquency until January, 1930, 
when he surrendered his contract to the plaintiff 
and 8he took possession of the property. We are 
thus of the opinion that no actionable fraud may 
be predicated on such claimed representations." 
Ackerman v. Bramwell Inc. Co. et. al. 80 U. 
52, 12 P. 2nd 623, 626. 
"Under any standard of conduct, and in the 
absence of accompanying actual deception, arti-
fice, or misconduct, it is well agreed that where 
the means of knowledge are at hand and are 
equally available to both parties, and the subject 
matter is equally open to their inspection, if one 
of them does not avail himself of those means 
and opportunities, he will not be heard to say 
that he ·wa8 deceived by the other's misrepresenta-
tions." 
23 Am. Jnr. Fraud and Deceit, Par. 155. 
Here, plaintiff should have taken precautions a pru-
dent investor ·would have taken before lending funds, 
8Uch as check credit rating, and get security for the loan. 
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A representation may be reli(•d upon only if a n·a::;on-
ably prudent person under tlw circ-umstancei'.:l would havt• 
done so. 
"The essence of what fop plaintiff is S('eking 
to accomplish is to have the defendant become in 
effect a surety or guarantor of the debt of Mickel-
son, without the defondant having so agreed or 
receiving anything for doing so. This would im-
pose liability in the nature of a contractual obliga-
tion in the absence of the classic essentials: a 
promise and a consideration. For this reason 
it is resorted to only where circumstances are 
such that equity and good conscience render its 
application imperative in order to avoid an ob-
vious unfairness and injustice. Further prereq-
uisites to the interposition of such an estoppel are 
the requirements that the promise or representa-
tion relied on must be sufficiently definite and 
certain that the plaintiff acting as a reasonable 
and prudent person under the circumstances 
would be justified in placing reliance upon it: 
and in case of uncertainty or doubt the responsi-
bility is upon the plaintiff to ascertain the facts 
before acting upon it." 
Petty v. Gindy Manufactitring Corpomtion, 
________ U. ________ , 404 P. 2d 30, 32. 
The Petty case in which the plaintiff there was 
represented by the same counsel as plaintiff Jardine 
here, was an attempt, as in this case, to hold the onr 
making a representation liable for damage suffered by 
the plaintiff's relying thereon. Although the Petty theory 
was promissory estoppel rather than J ardine's theory 
of negligence, the factual situation is similar. In the 
Petty case plaintiff made a loan to a third party, Mickel-
23 
:oon, who had assigned as security therefor commissions 
to he paid by the defendant Gindy who manufactured 
trailers sold by Mickelson as a dealer. Before making the 
loan Petty inquired as to the amount of commissions 
assignable as security. Gindy stated, "they have suffi-
cient orders in or pending to more than cover this." 
The conunissions turned out to be insufficient. The 
Court stated that Gindy, who made the representation, 
was not liable. 
If plaintiff is aware misstatement is untrue, he may 
not rely thereon. 
"Later, and before the plaintiff had become 
bound to convey and long before he had conveyed 
his ranch away, he was informed in writing that 
the annual income was $12,400. It is not claimed, 
and there is no proof to show that the last state-
ment was untrue. Thereafter the plaintiff wrote 
that he was desirous of making the trade, and 
later made it without any objection whatever that 
the income of the apartments had been misrepre-
sented .... 
"YV e agree with the trial court that the plain-
tiff failed to make out a case against either of 
the defendants, and that the verdict was correctly 
directed for all the defendants." 
Baird v. Eflow Inc. Co. et. al. 76 U. 232, 289 
P. 112, 114. 
"But we also understand the rule to be that 
if he became advised of the fraud perpetrated 
upon him in season to recede from his engage-
ment, and yet, with knowledge of the falsity of 
the representations which had induced the con-
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tract, elects to perform, and clearly manif osts hi~ 
intention to abide by the contract, he condones the 
fraud and is without remedy." 
Hull v. Flinders, 83 U. 158, 27 P. :2d 5G, 58. 
"Since the complaining party must rely on 
representations in order to render them action-
able, it follows that they must deceive him. In any 
fraud case, in order to secure relief, the complain-
ing party must, therefore, honestly confide in the 
representations or, as has been said, must reason-
ably believe them to be true. The law will not 
permit one to predicate damage upon statements 
which he does not believe to be true, for if he 
knows that they are false, it cannot truthfully be 
said that he is deceived by them. This principle 
is applicable however false and dishonest the rep-
resentations may be, and regardless of the fact 
that they are made with intent to deceive." 
23 Am. Jur. Fraud and Deceit, Par. 1-±3. 
Here the very fact that the builder needed to borrow 
from plaintiff apprised plaintiff of the fact he was unable 
to build the building. 
(i) PROXIMATE INJURY. 
- Plaintiff's claimed injury resulted from a poor loan, 
not from the builder's failure to complete a building and 
lease it to plaintiff. When any statement was made re-
garding Compact, neither Jardine nor Brunswick con-
templated that Jardine would be risking his own funds 
by making a loan to Charlesworth. Therefore the dam-
ages claimed from the poor loan are remote. 
Furthermore, if plaintiff is entitled to damages, it 
is plaintiff's burden to prove the amount thereof, which 
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he has not done. Plaintiff, when the building was par-
tially completed, ordered the builder off the job and 
demanded and received a conveyance of the property. 
(Ex. P. 14-, R. 349) The value of the improved property 
must be deducted from amounts expended therefor. 
"For false representations concerning finan-
cial condition, recovery may be had for all dam-
ages sustained as a natural consequence of the 
fraud, as where goods sold on false representa-
tions of the purchaser's solvency are not paid for 
and the measure of the defrauded seller's damages 
is the value of the goods with interest, or, if the 
seller does receive partial payment for his prop-
erty, the difference between the value of the 
property and the value of the consideration re-
ceived in exchange." 
37 CJS. Fraud, Par. 142(C). 
"Some cases hold that the measure of dam-
ages for fraudulent representations inducing a 
sale on credit to a third person is the value of 
the property at the time of the sale, less the 
amount paid and the value of any security taken. 
"The measure of damages for inducing a loan 
to a third person by misrepresenting his financial 
condition has been held to be the difference be-
tween the amount of the loan and the value of 
the security given for the loan, if any, at the date 
of the loan." 
Annotation, 72 ALR 2d, 943, 944, 945. 
There is no evidence as to its value, consequently 
plaintiff has failed to establish the amount of his dam-
ages. 
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POINT 2. 
PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT. 
Jardine had as much opportunity as did Brnnswick 
to check the assets, liabilities and net worth of Charles-
worth, and of the subsequently incorporated Compaet 
Buildings, the corporation with which Jardine ultimately 
dealt. 
A prudent investor before making a $23,000 loal! 
would: 
(a) Examine the borrower's financial statement. 
(b) Get a credit report. 
( c) Get adequate security even if the financial state-
ment and report were favorable. 
Plaintiff did none of these, yet looks to Brunswick as 
a guarantor against losses he would have avoided under 
usual good business practices. 
Plaintiff argues that he did not require a financial 
statement, as a prudent investor would have done, be-
cause he assumed Brunswick had done so, inasmuch as 
Brunswick had required Jardine to furnish a financial 
statement. The assumption is not justifiable, because the 
relationships are not comparable. Brunswick was intend-
ing to extend credit to Jardine. Neither Brunswick nor 
Jardine was intending to extend credit to the builder. 
There was no credit risk involved with the builder until 
Jardine decided to undertake the financing of the build-
ing himself. Only then did a financial statement becornP 
material. Brunswick, until then, had no reason to require 
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a financial statement bPcause neither it nor Jardine had 
a credit risk. If anyone was neglectful in not examining 
a financial statement when a loan was contemplated by 
Jardine, it was he. 
rrhe same is true of a credit report. 
Hegardless of information disclosed by a financial 
statement and credit report, a reasonably prudent person 
would have required adequate security. 
J ardine's most obvious contributory negligence, 
however, is in closing his eyes to the obvious conclusion 
that a builder, who is supposed to acquire a building site 
and construct and pay for a building of this size who does 
not initially have a $500 down payment for the land, and 
who has no funds with which to even commence construc-
tion is not in the best of financial shape. The very fact 
that the builder did not have funds, and couldn't get 
them, apprises plaintiff of the fact that the builder could 
not "build and finance the building," and that any state-
ment made by Brunswick to that effect was no longer 
true. 
In a recent case this court said: 
"Further than this, the pictures show that 
the land was covered with rocks up to the size of 
a man's head and it was so obviously rocky that 
if the plaintiffs had taken the trouble to walk over 
it, the most casual of inspections would have 
shown that it was not good for cultivation. Par-
rish did nothing to actively prevent the Paces 
from making an inspection and it would have been 
little trouble to do so. Under those circumstances, 
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\Ve believe that it must be• said as a matter of 
law that the plaintiffs did not use rea~-;onable caru 
and diligence. They were, thPrefon·, not t•ntitl('d 
to rely on the representation and that item of 
$1,750 in the judgment cannot be sustained." 
Pace, et al v. Parrish, et al. 122 U. 14-1, 2-!-7 
P. 2d 273, 275. 
POINT 3. 
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM RECOVERY BE-
CAUSE OF A RELEASE EXECUTED BY HIM. 
The judgment in favor of Jardine in effect make::; 
Brunswick the guarantor of the loan from plaintiff to 
the builder. Before Brunswick should be held liablr·, 
plaintiff should show that he has unsuccessfully de-
manded repayment from the borrower, Compact Build-
ings. The record shows no such demand, and in fact 
shows the contrary, that plaintiff affirmatively released 
Compact Buildings. (R. 226) 
This release by Jardine of Compact Buildings and 
Compact Buildings' release of any claim it had in the 
property or against Jardine puts Jardine in this position: 
He reaps the benefit of having his obligations to Compact 
Buildings discharged, he acquires and takes away from 
Compact Buildings an asset which af,fects Compact 
Buildings' solvency and ability to cover any loss claimed 
by Jardine, while at the same time Jardine saddles Bruns-
wick with all responsibility for Compact Buildings' ulti-
mate inability to perform. 
The general rules of guarty set forth in the following 
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paragraphs of 2± Arn. J ur. Guaranty would preclude a 
n•covery here. 
''7. Assurance, Recommendation, or Expres-
sion of Opinion. - A contract of guaranty is to be 
distinguished from an expression of opinion that 
a third per:-;on is trustworthy or reliable, from an 
assurance that he will comply with contracts or 
engagements, and from a representation that he 
is solvent, reliable, or the like. A statement of this 
character may not be relied on to establish con-
tractual relations; nor may the writer of a letter 
containing such assurances be held liable at the 
suit of the addressee unless it is shown that, to 
his knowledge, the observation or expression of 
oipnion was false. The authorities recognize that 
persons who are engaged in mercantile pursuits 
commonly recommend correspondents one to 
another without intending to become guarantors 
of the persons recommended." 
"87. Release of Principal Debtor; Discharge 
by Operation of Law. - Generally speaking, the 
guarantor is held to have been released or dis-
charged of liability where it appears that, by 
reason of some act or omission on the part of the 
creditor, the principal debtor has become dis-
charged of his obligation without satisfaction 
thereof." 
"108. Generally; Pursuit of Remedy by 
Creditor. - In some situations, at any rate, the 
creditor or obligee, prior to bringing action to 
recover on the contract of guaranty, is bound to 
take measures for the collection of the debt from 
the principal debtor, liability on the part of the 
guarantor being conditioned upon the exercise of 
diligence to promote payment by the debtor. The 
creditor must, unless the guaranty is absolute, de-
,;) 
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mand payment of the debtor and give notice of 
default to the guarantor; and if he fails to do so, 
he may be barred of recovery. 
" ... the guaranty is held to be conditional 
requiring the creditor to proceed against tlu'. 
debtor, where the contract purports to assun• or 
secure the creditor, where the guarantor hws 
agreed to indeminfy the creditor against loss, or 
where he has guaranteed the 'ultimate payment' 
of the debt or the 'collection' of the amount then·-
of." 
The primary obligation to plaintiff was the builder\;, 
to build and repay the loan, but the judgment against 
Brunswick makes it a coobligor. Under 15-4-4 and 15-4-3 
UCA 1953 the release of the builder, without a reserva-
tion of rights against Brunswick was a release of Bruns-
wick. 
"15-4-1. In this chapter ... 'obligation in-
cludes a liability in tort .... " 
"15-4-4. RELEASE OF CO-OBLIGOR -
RESERVATION OF RIGHTS. - Subject to the 
provisions of section 15-4-3. the obligee's release 
or discharge of one or more of several obligors, 
or of one or more of joint or of joint and several 
obligors, shall not discharge, co-obligors against 
whom the obligee in writing and as as part of the 
same transaction as the release or discharge ex-
pressly reserves his rights; and in the absence of 
such a reservation of rights shall discharge co-
obligors only to the extent provided in section 
15-4-5." 
"15-4-5. RELEASE OF CO-OBLIGOR -
EFFECT OF KNO"\VLEDGE OF OBLIGEE. -
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If an obligee releasing or discharging an obligor 
without ex1H'ess reservation of rights against a 
co-obligor then knows or has reason to know that 
the obligor released or discharged did not pay as 
much of the claim as he was bound by his con-
tract or relation with that co-obligor to pay, the 
obligee's claim against that co-obligor shall be 
satisfied to the amount which the obligee knew 
or had reason to know that the released or dis-
charged obligor was hound to such co-obligor to 
pay. 
"If an obligee so releasing or discharging an 
obligor has not then such knowledge or reason to 
know, the obligee's claim against the co-obligor 
shall be satisfied to the extent of the lesser of two 
amounts, namely: (a) the amount of the fractional 
share of the obligor released or discharged, or (b) 
the amount that such obligor was bound by his 
his contract or relation with the co-obligor to pay." 
POINT 4. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW DO NOT SUPPORT AN AW ARD, AND THE 
JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
The findings and conclusions ignore the points raised 
above and the judgment based thereon is therefore con-
trary to law. 
CONOLUSION 
Brunswick's motion to dismiss at the close of plain-
tiff's case should have been granted. The judgment 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRAYTON, LOWE & HURLEY 
JOHN W. LOWE 
